Signal dissolving into noise — coordinated information operations.
Threat

The threat picture · March 2026

Armenia stands where Poland stood twenty years ago — with one difference: she has eight months to do it.

In March 2025 Armenia's parliament passed the EU Integration Act — making Armenia the first South Caucasus state to formally choose the European road. In June 2026 the country votes in a defining parliamentary election. The Kremlin treats Armenia as "the next Moldova" and has launched information operations with an unprecedented eight-month lead time. Only 18% of Armenians can identify a fabricated story. No actor inside Armenia is building the capacity to proactively analyse coordinated AI-powered campaigns. AI Shield closes that gap.

Russia · Pre-election

Matryoshka & Storm-1516

The Matryoshka network kicked off eight months out — a record lead time for Russian influence operations. Over 60 AI-fabricated videos targeting Prime Minister Pashinyan, forged documents, the first-ever audio deepfake of an Armenian PM (June 2025). Storm-1516 — previously deployed against Poland, Germany and France — has expanded its reach into Armenia for the first time.

CSIN monitoring, AIISA report 2026

Iran · IRGC · Spillover

Forged CNN, Reuters and Bloomberg branding

Since February 2026, the Iran conflict has driven 21.9 million views of forged stories on X, with at least 10 manipulated videos using fake CNN, Reuters and Bloomberg branding targeted at Armenian audiences. 100,000 ethnic Armenians in Iran sit at the immediate edge of this information shock.

Open-source monitoring, March 2026

Azerbaijan · Constitutional debate

Permanent operations around the peace treaty

Azerbaijan demands amendments to Armenia's constitution before signing the peace treaty. It is the perfect manipulable subject: information operations run on a permanent cycle, with narratives that target the government, the opposition and the European turn simultaneously.

CSIN/AIISA analysis

Fact-checking verifies single claims. Operations analysis identifies coordinated campaigns — who runs them, with what narratives, through what channels, towards what political end. Without that capacity, Armenian CSOs see the trees but not the forest.