AI/SHIELD · DIAGNOSTIC WORKSHOP
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AI Shield · Information Resilience of Armenia

Diagnostic Workshop.

Poland's scars, your terrain, one toolkit.

Yerevan · 10-12 August 2026

Facilitated by Petros Tovmasyan · Jędrzej Błaszczak · Maciej Malik · Hosted with AIISA ↗ · RITA 22/RITA1/2026 ↗

Before we start

Two countries, one machine.

For a year, Armenia was the number-one target of Russia's most active disinformation network. A decade earlier, the same machine was pointed at Poland. We are not here to tell you about Armenia. We are here to tell you what it did to us, what we built against it, and to put the tools on the table.

CivilNet article on the Matryoshka network spreading deepfakes
CivilNet · May 2026 · Matryoshka deepfakes reported in your own press

The deal in this room

You are the experts on Armenia.

You bring

  • ·The terrain.
  • ·Real cases.
  • ·The judgement.

We bring

  • ·Poland's scars.
  • ·The toolkit, live.
  • ·A course you will own.
AIISA experts on a conference panel
AIISA on the panel · your expertise is the base layer

Welcome · Three days, one objective

What we do this week.

ISD report artwork on operations targeting Armenia
Day 1 · Map the threat

One clear picture of what targets Armenia. You draw it; we hold the marker and the method.

InVID WeVerify verification plugin interface
Day 2 · Test the toolkit

A Polish fake torn apart live, then the same bench on cases you bring. Hands on the keyboard.

The Cascade stairway in Yerevan
Day 3 · Design the programme

The 54-hour course, written together, ready to run in October. Yours to own by spring.

Exercise 1 · The view from outside

This is what the world reads about you.

The external paper trail: ISD, DFRLab, CheckFirst. Sample finding: 72 fake sites aimed at your election, 17 recycled from France. The exercise: what did they get right, what did they miss, where are they wrong? Your gap list feeds the curriculum. Every image links to the original report.

Sources: EEAS 4th FIMI Report · EUvsDisinfo

The artefact pool · documented, debunked

The fakes, as documented.

Fabricated newscasts, AI-generated 'supporters', the PM's cloned voice: all documented by fact-checkers, yours and international. This is the artefact pool Day 2 draws from. Click any image for the full debunk.

The artefact pool · continued

The PM's face. The PM's voice.

Both already faked, both already documented. Click for the full debunks.

Interlude · Your turn

Real or fake?

A social media post with a video of PM Pashinyan

A verified-looking account. A translated caption. A video of the Prime Minister. 34,700 views. Your call:

Poland · 2014-2026

We were the test range.

2014Crimea. Poland becomes a standing target of Russian information operations.
2015-2021Migration-crisis fear campaigns; 'NATO will drag you into war' enters the bloodstream.
2022Full-scale war next door. Refugee-wave panic ops; 'Poland bankrupts itself for Ukraine.'
2024Doppelgänger exposed in Poland: our biggest newsrooms cloned at look-alike addresses.
2025Russian drones cross into Poland; the fakes arrive faster than the official statement.
2026Poland exports the playbook of defence. That is why we are in this room.

Sources: EUvsDisinfo database · EEAS FIMI reporting

Poland · Case 1 · Doppelgänger

They cloned our newsrooms.

Pixel-accurate copies of TVN24, Onet, Interia and Wprost at look-alike addresses, publishing invented stories with our mastheads on top. Exposed by Demagog's investigation and state institutions working the same case.

Armenia got the France24 clone. Same factory, different masthead.

Demagog investigation cover: Akcja Doppelganger
Demagog · 'Akcja Doppelgänger. Ujawniamy, jak rosyjskie służby mieszały w Polsce'

Poland · Case 2 · September 2025

Drones first. Fog within hours.

The night Russian drones crossed into Polish airspace, the information operation was already running: 'a Ukrainian provocation', 'NATO staged it', 'Poland is at war'. The physical incident and the information incident are one event.

On Day 2 this becomes our live teardown case: we know its ground truth end to end.

Poland · What we built

The Polish stack.

State layer. NASK runs a standing counter-disinformation unit: monitoring, election protection, public alerts, takedown coordination.

Civic layer. Demagog, Konkret24 and academic teams do the daily debunking and the deep investigations, independent of government.

EU layer. EEAS FIMI reporting and the DSA give the national layers leverage against platforms.

The transferable part is not any single institution. It is the division of labour.

NASK counter-disinformation unit page
NASK · 'Przeciwdziałamy dezinformacji' · the state counter-disinfo unit

Poland · What failed

What we got wrong.

  • ·Started late. Years after the first attacks.
  • ·Debunks lagged. Lies in minutes, corrections in days.
  • ·Silos. State, media, NGOs barely shared.
  • ·Politicisation. A suspected referee loses every room.
  • ·Platform dependence. Tools kept dying under us.

Ten years of tuition, paid by someone else. Yours free.

The same machine, re-skinned

Same stories, new masthead.

Cloned TVN24, Onet, Interia, Wprost: our four biggest newsrooms, at look-alike addresses.

Cloned France24; faked CNN and Reuters logos.

'NATO faked the 2025 drones', to drag Poles into war.

'You'll end up like Ukraine.'

PM cast as a 'puppet of Brussels' who sold out the country.

The prime minister smeared, with AI deepfakes.

'Poland bankrupts itself for Ukraine', plus the 1943 Volhynia massacre used to split Poles from Ukrainians.

Fear of attack, economic ruin, grievance.

Sources: EUvsDisinfo · EEAS 4th FIMI Report · DFRLab

The project

AI Shield at a glance.

Funded by

RITA - Region in Transition (Polish-American Freedom Foundation)

Duration

June 2026 - May 2027

Lead / Partner

CSIN (Poland) · AIISA (Armenia)

Total budget

PLN 81,260

Two tracks

A: experts (analysts) · B: wider circle (CSOs, media)

Outcomes

5 measurable results

RITA programmePolish-American Freedom FoundationEducation for Democracy FoundationCSINAIISA

The model

A cascade of capability.

  • ·Track A: experts. 12 to 15 analysts from AIISA and partner institutes go deep.
  • ·They become trainers. Those analysts then train the next, wider group, in Armenian.
  • ·Track B. 30 to 36 civil-society and media staff. Broad reach.

The real test of success is not what we teach you, it is what you teach others. Track B is delivered by AIISA, not by us.

The Cascade in Yerevan
Yerevan · the Cascade. Level by level. That is the model.

The journey

Where this workshop fits.

1

Diagnostic Workshop

Yerevan · Aug 2026

You are here

2

Training the trainers

54 h · Oct-Dec 2026

3

Pilot workshops

AIISA-led · Jan-Mar 2027

4

Toolkit, report, panel

Apr-May 2027

Full activity details: the project page ↗

This week

What we leave the room with.

  • ·Threat map. Yours, in DISARM language.
  • ·Gap list. Where reports end, you begin.
  • ·Tested toolkit. Tried on real cases.
  • ·Draft course. Ready for October.

Day 1 of 3

The landscape. Split screen.

  • ·We talk: Poland. Clones, drones, the stack, the failures.
  • ·You talk: the gap. Reports versus what you know.
  • ·Together: the wall map.
  • ·Debrief. What we dig into tomorrow.
Myth Detector debunk article of an AI-generated video
Myth Detector · a debunk walked through end to end, the Day 1 warm-up

Day 1 of 3 · Watch

Fact-checking compass · how to spot information manipulation · click to play

Five minutes on how the trick works.

A short explainer we play in the room: the anatomy of information manipulation, in plain language, before we touch any tool. Sources it points to: EUvsDisinfo and EDMO.

Day 2 of 3 · The material

You bring the cases. We bring the bench.

CivilNet illustration: Matryoshka network deepfake post targeting PM Pashinyan
CivilNet · May 2026 · Matryoshka deepfake post with a call to violence. Documented evidence, the kind of artefact we work on.

Material like this is your daily reality; you know it better than any visitor. What we add is a repeatable bench process: the same artefact, taken apart the same way, every time, producing evidence that holds up.

Yardstick from your own record: the June 2025 audio deepfake reached 280,000 views in 36 hours and was debunked in 9.

The training goal is simple: from 9 hours to 2.

Day 2 of 3 · Live, no safety net

60 minutes, one fake, full teardown.

We open the September 2025 'Ukrainian provocation' drone fake, a Polish case whose ground truth we know end to end, and take it apart on the projector:

01 · The artefact

The post, the account, the claim. What exactly are we testing?

02 · Frames

InVID WeVerify: keyframes, reverse image search, prior appearances.

03 · Forensics

FotoForensics ELA and Hive: what was pasted, what was generated.

04 · Infrastructure

Domains, DNS history, archives: who registered what, when.

05 · Spread

TGStat and Telemetrio: which channels moved first, how tightly timed.

06 · The graph

Gephi: the amplification network, drawn from the data on screen.

Then the second pass: same bench, your case, your hands on the keyboard. Tagged in DISARM, archived per the Berkeley Protocol.

Day 2 of 3 · Watch

AFP · How to use InVID-WeVerify · 4 min tutorial · click to play

The plugin, shown by the people who built it.

AFP's own four-minute walkthrough of InVID-WeVerify, the browser add-on we drill on Day 2. Watch it once here, then do it yourself on a real Armenian case.

Day 2 of 3 · The bench, tool by tool

The toolkit, hands-on.

Every tile links to the tool itself. Free or freemium, so nothing dies with the project budget.

Day 2 of 3 · The bench, continued

From channels to the map.

The method matters more than the tool. Tools die; the bench process survives them. Plus: InVID WeVerify ↗ · Hive ↗ · Telemetrio · NodeXL

Part 2: the open arsenal, GitHub × Hugging Face →

Day 3 of 3

Designing the programme.

  • ·The 54-hour course, written together.
  • ·The pass mark: a measured 30% jump in skill.
  • ·The people: your strongest 12 to 15.
  • ·Roles and dates for October.

Anchored on: DISARM framework ↗ (EEAS, EDMO) · Berkeley Protocol (UN-backed evidence collection) · Kolb cycle and teach-back

Working together

How we work, and the rules of the room.

Division of labour

  • CSIN: the Polish record, the bench, running the sessions.
  • AIISA: the terrain, real cases, the security picture, the people.
  • Language: Armenian-language mentoring throughout (Karolina Grigoryan).

Rules of the room

  • Nothing is quoted by name, so speak freely.
  • Our working language is English.
  • Candid beats polite.
  • Everything this week is a working draft.
AIISA analytical team in Yerevan
AIISA · the analytical team, Yerevan

The ask

What we ask of you.

  • ·Your candid read. You live this, we don't.
  • ·Real cases for the bench.
  • ·Your strongest 12 to 15.
  • ·Honest feedback.
  • ·Ownership by spring.

The horizon

Beyond the workshop.

  • ·An Armenian team that works alone.
  • ·Findings reaching ministries and the EU.
  • ·A joint NATO bid in 2027.
  • ·A model for the region.

Close

Your terrain. Our scars. One shield.

Thank you. Let's get to work.

Petros Tovmasyan · CSIN ↗ × AIISA ↗ · contact@caucasian.network

Funded under the RITA - Region in Transition ↗ programme of the Polish-American Freedom Foundation ↗, run by the Education for Democracy Foundation ↗.

Some backdrops generated with the open-source Z-Image model in seconds. The attackers use the same tech. That is why we are here.